Continuing his Michael Faraday Christmas Lectures, Growing Up in the Universe, Richard Dawkins begins by asking a seemingly simple question: what are living organisms (bees, for instance) for?The question seems so innocent that there is a very long tradition of thinkers who have thought it obvious, not simply that there is an asnswer to such a question, but that they actually knew what the answer was. And it turns out that most versions of the answer have been exceptionally anthropocentric: whatever their purpose, somehow all beings in the universe are there for us. How convenient :)
It should come as no surprise to you that Dawkins doesn't find this sort of answer satisfactory. Instead, he eloquently argues that the purpose of living organisms is given to them by their genes: make more copies of those genes. That's the general point, but of course, the details and support, as well as Dawkins' meditations on the concept of the extended phenotype are primarily what make this lecture fascinating.
As a nice treat, there is an awesome appearance and reading by Douglas Adams, author of The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy.
Of course, the question of what the world is for is a very treacherous one, as Douglas Adams himself points out in this funny and thought-provoking excerpt (read by Simon Jones) from a fascinating talk he gave in 1998 about the hydrocentric point of view of a puddle (perfect timing, as I'm currently reading The Salmon of Doubt):
Unfortunately, I think Dawkins himself might be mistaken here, and confusing what is with what the something that is is for... the fact that genes construct complex organisms that perpetuate the existence of such genes doesn't mean that's what organisms are for... it just means that's what they do.
I may have to think about this further, but it seems to me, intuitively at least, that the question of what something is for will always require us to posit an agency or mind to provide that purpose. Without a mind, nothing is for anything. Things just are what they are...
Unfortunately, I think Dawkins himself might be mistaken here, and confusing what is with what the something that is is for... the fact that genes construct complex organisms that perpetuate the existence of such genes doesn't mean that's what organisms are for... it just means that's what they do.
I may have to think about this further, but it seems to me, intuitively at least, that the question of what something is for will always require us to posit an agency or mind to provide that purpose. Without a mind, nothing is for anything. Things just are what they are...
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Hey its Chris Putnam here, I think this excerpt from "Lila" is similar to what your comment is about Dawkins view about what we are here for "The Second Law of Thermodynamics states that all energy systems run down like a clock and never rewind themselves. But life not only 'runs up,' converting low energy sea-water, sunlight and air into high-energy chemicals, it keeps multiplying itself into more and better clocks that keep 'running up' faster and faster. Why, for example, should a group of simple, stable compounds of carbon, hydrogen, oxygen and nitrogen struggle for billions of years to organize themselves into a professor of chemistry? What's the motive? If we leave a chemistry professor out on a rock in the sun long enough the forces of nature will convert him into simple compounds of carbon, oxygen, hydrogen and nitrogen, calcium, phosphorus, and small amounts of other minerals. It's a one-way reaction. No matter what kind of chemistry professor we use and no matter what process we use we can't turn these compounds back into a chemistry professor. Chemistry professors are unstable mixtures of predominantly unstable compounds which, in the exclusive presence of the sun's heat, decay irreversibly into simpler organic and inorganic compounds. That's a scientific fact. The question is: Then why does nature reverse this process? What on earth causes the inorganic compounds to go the other way? It isn't the sun's energy. We just saw what the sun's energy did. It has to be something else. What is it?" Robert Pirsig. Science can tell us what or how something is made but it can not tell us is there is a why, or a motive behind it.
ReplyDeleteThis is part of an interview between Pirsig, and Julian Baggini that further expands upon what he said in "Lila"
ReplyDeleteBAGGINI: One final question about aspects of the MOQ that might help explain academic resistance to it. LILA has a remarkably wide scope and as a result it often deals with, dismisses or solves ideas rather brusquely.
For example, at one point you say “[The theory of evolution] goes into many volumes about how the fittest survive but never once goes into the question of why.” (p144)
Most biologists would see that as blatantly untrue, and that furthermore, if you think the question of why the fittest survive hasn't been answered by the theory of evolution, you just haven't understood it. Now it may well be that you have responses to this and can explain why it is you think the question of why the fittest survive hasn't really been addressed. But if you present your thesis in this telescopic, sweeping way, surely you can't complain if informed critics dismiss you. You can't expect them to take it on trust that behind these assertions are more careful, fuller arguments that justify the claims.
PIRSIG: That line was an integral part of an entire chapter on the subject and thus cannot be called telescopic. I would answer that biologists who think my question doesn't understand the theory of evolution are biologists who do not understand the difference between “how” and “why.” The answers they give for “why” are usually “competitive advantage” or “survival of the fittest.” But if you look closely you will see that these are not scientific terms. “Fittest” is a subjective term. It exists only in the mind of a scientific observer. It isn't out there in the nature he observes. The same is true of “advantage.” Ask a biologist who thinks my question doesn't understand the theory of evolution, to define in exact scientific terms the meaning of these evaluative words. If he takes time to do so I predict he will give up or he will come up with nonsense or he will find himself drifting eventually toward the solutions arrived at by the Metaphysics of Quality.Finally I must say how pleased I have to have these questions raised and the manner in which they are raised. This is circumspection at its best."
I'm not familiar with Lila (and have my doubts about the metaphysics of quality and its primacy over subject/object), but this line: "Chemistry professors are unstable mixtures of predominantly unstable compounds" is one of the funniest things I've read recently. Thanks!
ReplyDelete