tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-636951901001451111.post7849257388269198562..comments2024-01-01T22:54:46.635-05:00Comments on Philosophy Monkey: Plato's Euthyphro: The Ultimate Refutation of Religious MoralityUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-636951901001451111.post-79919286764922917912011-01-10T20:50:06.473-05:002011-01-10T20:50:06.473-05:00Dear Nerd42, I actually happen to agree with most ...Dear Nerd42, I actually happen to agree with most of your analysis of the Euthyphro, so I'm not sure whether you were disagreeing with anything I said or with something else.<br /><br />In terms of Dostoevsky, however, I don't see how he's taking the Socratic side. For him, if morality has any objective basis, it must come from God. That puts him squarely on the Euthyphro side of the dilemma.<br /><br />And if you think about it, one of the logical implications of the Socratic side (though Socrates himself never makes this point explicitly) is that goodness, as you do seem to correctly point out, has a real and objective basis, which renders it (and this is the catch for the religious believer) independent from any theistic foundation.Bertohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01503875646262119427noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-636951901001451111.post-31206468665476656432010-10-08T23:31:31.076-04:002010-10-08T23:31:31.076-04:00Dude, Socrates was a THEIST as clearly shown in th...Dude, Socrates was a THEIST as clearly shown in the Phaedo and even though he didn't seem to believe in the Greek gods of the state, Socratic dialogues (especially the Euthyphro) are there to make you ask the right questions, not to give you answers. The Euthyphro dialogue is between two different kinds of very moralistic theists, not between a moralistic theist and an amoralistic atheist. It doesn't even deal with the idea that that without God there would be no basis for morality, it only points out that things can't be moral or immoral because God says so unless God is identified with some kind of objective good. Accepting the terms of the Euthyphro dilemma means rejecting the idea that God's goodness is wholly incongruous with ours.<br /><br />So, if we're going to be moralistic theists, (atheism isn't even considered in the Euthyphro dilemma, however much atheists like to emphasize any dilemma for theists which they don't have to deal with) we are only logically consistent if we're going to be one particular kind of moralistic theist, the kind that takes Socrates's side and say that God is good only so long as "goodness" still has a real, objective meaning.<br /><br />Dostoevsky's point is that there is no morality without an ultimate authority. He states his argument with the ambiguous term, "God" which has understandably led to your confusion about what he meant but the point is, his argument isn't taking Euthyphro's side here. In this case, he's taking the Socratic side if he's taking either side.<br /><br />C. S. Lewis deals with this issue definitely in chapter 3 of "The Problem of Pain" which you can read here: http://www.mrrena.com/2002/goodness.shtmlNerd42https://www.blogger.com/profile/18113624347939509918noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-636951901001451111.post-41637270010341938552008-06-09T15:19:00.000-04:002008-06-09T15:19:00.000-04:00Thanks for the link, Paul. I read the article with...Thanks for the link, Paul. I read the article with great enthusiasm, being previously unfamiliar with a real refutation of the Euthyphro dilemma. Unfortunately, however, the problem with this 'solution' is that it begs the question (argues in a circle), so it is logically unsound.<BR/><BR/>In short, it argues that because God exists in the form of three separate-yet-equal persons (father, son, holy spirit), the testimony of one of those persons corroborates the testimony of the others. The problem is that these independent witnesses are not actually independent: they are all the same person! So no independent corroboration is actually being presented, even though that's the claim.<BR/><BR/>The following analogy is not entirely accurate, but it makes my point obvious: think of God as someone with multiple-personality disorder, and then imagine one of these personalities vouching for another personality belonging to the same person. Would this be credible testimony, or would we need an independent, completely separate witness in order to corroborate the testimony of the original personality?<BR/><BR/>Because of this, the 'solution' presented by Pastor Bob doesn't actually save the Christian God from the Euthyphro dilemma...<BR/><BR/>So, the score so far:<BR/>God = 0 Plato = 1<BR/><BR/>Anyone else have a way out of this dilemma?Bertohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01503875646262119427noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-636951901001451111.post-4250814965619550162008-03-13T17:43:00.000-04:002008-03-13T17:43:00.000-04:00Since this post mentions the Euthyphro Dilemma, I ...Since this post mentions the Euthyphro Dilemma, I thought you might like to read this article: <BR/><B>"A Christian Answer to the Euthyphro Dilemma"</B> <A HREF="http://www.theologyonline.com/forums/showthread.php?t=47024" REL="nofollow">(link)</A>.Paulhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01702283633332594541noreply@blogger.com