Considering that conventional wisdom is seldom wise, however, it should come as no surprise to anyone that about 2,350 years ago, the ancient philosopher Socrates came up with the ultimate logical refutation of the idea that religious doctrine could be the source of any morality worth respecting. Why should this be the case? Well, because Socrates had the courage and the philosophical brilliance to ask a seemingly innocent question that has proved to be an absolute nightmare for theists ever since: Are right actions right because they are commanded by God, or are they commanded by God because they're right?
The philosophical insights derived from this simple question were beautifully expressed in Plato's early dialogue Euthyphro, and what Socrates shows is that Dostoevsky got it exactly backwards: he should have said that "only with God could anything be permitted" because if morality came from God, then God could arbitrarily command anything, like telling Abraham to sacrifice his son Isaac, not for any particularly important reason or for any greater good, but just for shit and giggles, just to see if he will do it.
You may object and say "Oh, but God wouldn't command something heinous like that." Why not? Because it's wrong? If you say yes, aren't you conceding, implicitly at least, the fact that morality is independent of God, and that God is therefore ultimately irrelevant to questions of morality and objective values since some things are wrong regardless of what God may say or think?
If you want to download a pdf version of this wonderful piece of classic literature and philosophy, click here.
Some people are clever enough to try to call the Euthyphro dilemma a false dilemma. They argue that there are more possible choices besides those allowed for by Socrates. They may argue, for instance, that goodness is part of God's essential nature, which is, by definition, to be benevolent, loving, merciful, etc., but this is just a different way of saying that God is good by definition, which is still the first horn of the dilemma, just dressed up and prettied up to look better, but it's still the same corpse beneath the dress.
But let's grant the theist his accusation of a false dilemma. Socrates could play the same game and corner the theist exactly into the same corner once again, as this hilarious cartoon shows:
And if you're confused about what the Euthyphro dialogue was all about, don't feel bad. Most people miss the point the first time around, but luckly for you, philosopher Louise Antony explains it with great clarity in this fascinating debate against theist philosopher William Lane Craig.
Since this post mentions the Euthyphro Dilemma, I thought you might like to read this article:
ReplyDelete"A Christian Answer to the Euthyphro Dilemma" (link).
Thanks for the link, Paul. I read the article with great enthusiasm, being previously unfamiliar with a real refutation of the Euthyphro dilemma. Unfortunately, however, the problem with this 'solution' is that it begs the question (argues in a circle), so it is logically unsound.
ReplyDeleteIn short, it argues that because God exists in the form of three separate-yet-equal persons (father, son, holy spirit), the testimony of one of those persons corroborates the testimony of the others. The problem is that these independent witnesses are not actually independent: they are all the same person! So no independent corroboration is actually being presented, even though that's the claim.
The following analogy is not entirely accurate, but it makes my point obvious: think of God as someone with multiple-personality disorder, and then imagine one of these personalities vouching for another personality belonging to the same person. Would this be credible testimony, or would we need an independent, completely separate witness in order to corroborate the testimony of the original personality?
Because of this, the 'solution' presented by Pastor Bob doesn't actually save the Christian God from the Euthyphro dilemma...
So, the score so far:
God = 0 Plato = 1
Anyone else have a way out of this dilemma?
Dude, Socrates was a THEIST as clearly shown in the Phaedo and even though he didn't seem to believe in the Greek gods of the state, Socratic dialogues (especially the Euthyphro) are there to make you ask the right questions, not to give you answers. The Euthyphro dialogue is between two different kinds of very moralistic theists, not between a moralistic theist and an amoralistic atheist. It doesn't even deal with the idea that that without God there would be no basis for morality, it only points out that things can't be moral or immoral because God says so unless God is identified with some kind of objective good. Accepting the terms of the Euthyphro dilemma means rejecting the idea that God's goodness is wholly incongruous with ours.
ReplyDeleteSo, if we're going to be moralistic theists, (atheism isn't even considered in the Euthyphro dilemma, however much atheists like to emphasize any dilemma for theists which they don't have to deal with) we are only logically consistent if we're going to be one particular kind of moralistic theist, the kind that takes Socrates's side and say that God is good only so long as "goodness" still has a real, objective meaning.
Dostoevsky's point is that there is no morality without an ultimate authority. He states his argument with the ambiguous term, "God" which has understandably led to your confusion about what he meant but the point is, his argument isn't taking Euthyphro's side here. In this case, he's taking the Socratic side if he's taking either side.
C. S. Lewis deals with this issue definitely in chapter 3 of "The Problem of Pain" which you can read here: http://www.mrrena.com/2002/goodness.shtml
Dear Nerd42, I actually happen to agree with most of your analysis of the Euthyphro, so I'm not sure whether you were disagreeing with anything I said or with something else.
ReplyDeleteIn terms of Dostoevsky, however, I don't see how he's taking the Socratic side. For him, if morality has any objective basis, it must come from God. That puts him squarely on the Euthyphro side of the dilemma.
And if you think about it, one of the logical implications of the Socratic side (though Socrates himself never makes this point explicitly) is that goodness, as you do seem to correctly point out, has a real and objective basis, which renders it (and this is the catch for the religious believer) independent from any theistic foundation.